AVGEEK
Royal Jordanian’s bet on India and the Levant
Karim Makhlouf examines Royal Jordanian’s Mumbai and Delhi routes, fleet growth plans and engine-risk management, alongside using ExplorJordan to connect airline capacity with tourism demand.
The conversation
In Episode 76 of The Indian AvGeek , host Vishal Mehra sits down with Karim Makhlouf, CCO of Royal Jordanian Airlines, for a deep dive in global aviation strategy.
Karim shares commercial insights from his 27-year career, pioneering €19 fare drops at Germanwings, navigating mid-sized flag carrier challenges at Malév Hungary, and launching premium startups like SaudiGulf.
He breaks down Royal Jordanian’s roadmap to 52 aircraft by 2032, the performance of the Mumbai and Delhi routes, GTF engine insulation tactics, and turning empty seats into high-yield tourism via the ExplorJordan platform.
Key Takeaways
- Royal Jordanian needs a route-specific competitive position, not a smaller imitation of Dubai or Doha.
- Levant connectivity is promising but must be risk-adjusted for border, airspace and demand volatility.
- Mumbai and Delhi are distinct mixtures of tourism, visiting-friends-and-relatives and onward transfer flows.
- Holiday packaging is a way to monetise otherwise weak inventory; package turnover is not the same as airline profit.
- Aircraft-delivery and engine-availability constraints can overturn a theoretically attractive network plan.
- Premiumisation only works when revenue covers the complexity of service, connection and distribution.
- The strongest strategy for a small network carrier is operational resilience matched to a few defensible flows.
Editorial analysis
Editorial context
Royal Jordanian has a smaller home market and fewer aircraft than its Gulf neighbours. Karim Makhlouf’s answer is not to copy their megahubs, but to make Amman, the Levant and carefully selected Indian routes do different work.
The competitive map is the starting constraint
Amman is not Dubai. Its geography gives Royal Jordanian access to European, North American and Levantine traffic, but the airline operates within reach of very large competing transfer systems. Karim Makhlouf’s experience at Germanwings, Gulf Air and SaudiGulf makes his account of the trade-off unusually concrete. Airline strategies often begin with an expansive target network and work backwards to aircraft. Makhlouf instead argues that the first decision is which flows the airline has a chance of winning. A regional flag carrier cannot sustainably imitate the product breadth, frequencies and marketing expenditure of Gulf megahubs without matching their capital base. Its comparative advantage must be defined at the itinerary level: direct access to Jordan, practical connections to less-served neighbouring markets and coherent price and schedule propositions. That is a narrower strategy, but a more testable one.
The Levant is a network thesis, not a map label
Makhlouf describes the Levant as the second pillar of the carrier’s plan, a catchment spanning markets whose commercial traffic is partly underserved and whose political environment can change abruptly. The temptation is to read a large combined population as an available addressable market. Population is not demand; demand depends on incomes, travel rules, infrastructure and alternatives. For Royal Jordanian, some markets offer scarce direct service and useful connections via Amman. But there is no guaranteed premium for geographical proximity. A sector that offers geographic convenience can be undermined by visa friction, airspace closure, weak distribution or volatile security conditions. The strategy is therefore both an opportunity and a concentration risk. It deserves analysis at origin-and-destination pair level, not merely by regional demographic totals.
India is more valuable as several markets than one
The resumption of Mumbai and Delhi service poses a useful problem for revenue managers. Indian passengers may be travelling to Jordan itself, onward to Europe or North America, or into parts of the Levant with limited alternatives. These are different customer groups with different fare ceilings, seasonality and willingness to connect. Makhlouf says tourism traffic was initially slower than hoped, while connecting flows to Iraq, Egypt and the region were more promising. That is revealing: an airline’s public route story may emphasise tourism, but the underlying business case can rest on labour, family, trade and connecting demand. The routes’ performance cannot be inferred from their launch announcements. A serious assessment needs booking-origin data, sixth-freedom yield, connection reliability and the share of genuinely incremental traffic captured from other gateways.
Tourism is an inventory-management tool
The carrier’s ExplorJordan approach tries to turn distressed inventory into a more complete customer proposition. Makhlouf discusses packages bundling flights with hotels and experiences, even sketching an illustrative seven-night price. The business logic is subtler than discounting seats. If the aircraft has inventory likely to expire unsold, packaging can attract visitors while preserving the perceived value of a standalone fare. But the apparent gain depends on the net contribution after hotel contracting, distribution, cancellations and service obligations. A package also changes the airline’s exposure: it is no longer merely selling transport but assuring the value of a multi-supplier holiday. The airline must resist promoting illustrative prices as representative yields or using package revenue to mask weakness on the underlying route.
The engine problem is a strategy problem
Royal Jordanian’s fleet renewal illustrates the distance between an orderbook and an operational timetable. Makhlouf describes newer aircraft delays and explains why Embraer E2 equipment had to cover longer European flying than originally intended. That is a practical response to constraint, but not costless: stage length, seat count, baggage, premium demand and schedule robustness change the route’s contribution. Pratt & Whitney geared-turbofan inspection issues across the industry add a separate dimension of availability risk. Aircraft acquisition promises may persuade an investor or a tourism authority; delivered, dispatchable aircraft determine how many passengers the airline can serve. Fleet planning should include disruption scenarios rather than assume every promised aircraft arrives on time and works at planned utilisation.
The premium proposition has to be selective
Makhlouf’s journey through low-cost startups and network carriers exposes why ‘hybrid’ is often an evasive label. At Germanwings, aggressive fares and simpler distribution had a specific market purpose; at Royal Jordanian, long-haul and transit passengers require connections, baggage and service reliability. The latter capabilities cannot simply be added as revenue-generating extras without cost. The question is where a smaller carrier can invest selectively: high-value connecting banks, a dependable front cabin on suitable routes, or destination packages that put otherwise empty aircraft seats to work. Every product should be evaluated against the counterfactual of doing less, better. A multi-product strategy only creates value when incremental revenue outstrips the extra complexity it adds.
Resilience is the real differentiator
Makhlouf reflects on managing teams across different geographies and political contexts. The central implication is that an airline’s commercial model cannot be detached from its institution, culture and surrounding state. A traffic flow that looks good in an annual presentation can disappear after a border closure or sudden change in travel demand. Royal Jordanian’s potential advantage is not invulnerability to those shocks, but a network constructed to switch emphasis between local traffic, connecting flows and tourism. That proposition requires enough liquidity and aircraft flexibility to survive a bad season. The interview thus offers a disciplined counterpoint to the Gulf’s scale race: a smaller flag carrier can aim to be structurally useful without attempting to be universally dominant.
Questions & answers
Why does Amman matter?
For a smaller airline, Amman can connect Jordan, nearby underserved Levant markets and selective long-haul flows, without trying to replicate a Gulf megahub.
Are the India flights principally tourism routes?
Makhlouf describes tourism ambition but also substantial connecting demand into the region; the mix needs route-level verification.
What does ExplorJordan change?
It seeks to bundle leisure demand with unused seat capacity, subject to the economics of the complete package.
Why operate E2 aircraft on longer routes?
The guest connects the deployment to delays in newer Airbus deliveries and the need to keep the network operating.
What makes a smaller national airline durable?
An identifiable route advantage, disciplined capacity, reliable aircraft and the flexibility to withstand political and demand shocks.
Sources & attribution
Original recording and provenance: Listen to the original AvGeek episode. First released 10 August 2026.
Editorial basis: Interpretive analysis of the published discussion and available archive evidence. Questions and answers are editorial paraphrases, not verbatim interview quotations. Historical statements are attributed to the recording context, not certified as current October 2026 facts.
Historical verification: Royal Jordanian’s plans for India services, fleet and route economics are dated interview assessments, not a claim about services currently operating.